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A CALL TO ARMS: RESCUING UNIVERSITIES
AND SMALL BUSINESSES FROM FULLY LOADED
PATENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

Acacia Technology Group recently initiated "one of the most
widespread patent licensing programs ever...."'
The technology
purportedly covered by Acacia's patents is termed Digital Media
Transmission (DMT),2 otherwise known as streaming media. The broad
nature of the patent involved is shocking, to say the least, given the
countless number of Internet users who stream media files daily. Who is
subject to Acacia's licensing demands? The answer is virtually any
company with a website that streams stored audio or video.3
Understandably, commentators suggest that "few topics hold greater
potential implications for streaming business then Acacia Research's patent
claims .... 4
Acacia's DMT patents "involve[] the transmission and receipt of
digital audio and/or audio video content via a variety of means including
the internet, cable, satellite, and local area networks."5 Essentially, Acacia
claims ownership of patent rights covering streaming media. Streaming
media is best defined as "multimedia streams ... transmitted over the
Internet and played on a client machine. Media files are large. In contrast
to downloaded files, streaming media starts playing as soon as the first6
chunk of the audio/video data arrives, the rest coming later as a stream.",
1. See Victor de Gyarfas, Acacia's Digital Media Transmission Patent Licensing Gun:
Bullets or Invalid Blanks?, 2 ANDREWS E-BUS. L. BULL. 16, 16 (2004).
2. Acacia
Technologies
Group,
DMT
Technology,
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/technology.Amt.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
3. See Gyarfas, supranote 1.
4. Eric Schumacher-Rasmussen, Streaming Media East 2004: Acacia Still a Hot-Button
Issue,
STREAMINGMEDIA.COM,
June
2,
2004,
http://www.streamingmedia.com/article.asp?id=8647&preview=y.
5. Acacia
Technologies
Group,
DMT
Technology,
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/technology-dmt.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
6. CollabWorx,
Inc.,
Glossary
of
Terms,
http://www.webwisdom.com/support/resources/glossary.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2004).
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Because streaming media is a very common method of transmitting audio
and video data over the Internet, the patents' scope extends to nearly every
business or organization that incorporates digital audio or video into its
website. 7 Such a sweeping patent deserves discussion, especially given
that Acacia's patents and licensing strategy present interesting and often
detrimental results on those affected by its tactics.
Acacia's patent portfolio and licensing strategy epitomize the patent
law debates currently underway in the United States. Modem patent
disputes arise primarily from difficulties in reconciling the two key
competing public interests in patent law: compensating inventors for their
efforts in developing new and useful inventions, and granting the public
access to or use of technological innovations without obstruction.8 Lord
Mansfield long ago described these competing interests:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally
prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed
their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour;
the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements,
nor the progress of the arts be retarded. 9
Put simply, if the United States patent system serves each of the above
interests, the "system is a major catalyst for technological process and
economic growth." 10 Conversely, where one of these interests is favored
over another, enforcing a patent in the United States may disrupt innovative
progress. And when disruptive patents are introduced, even if otherwise
valid, they should not be allowed to interfere with the primary purposes of
patent law, namely "to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 1
This argument holds especially true where a company's patents are being
used to exploit revenue through questionable business practices, and those
same patents fail to enforce any positive reason for the existence of the
Patent Clause. Part II of this article summarizes United States patent law,
describes the underlying principles for inclusion of the Patent Clause in
Article I of the United States Constitution, and introduces issues and

7. See John Borland, Patent Scare Hits Streaming Industry, CNET NEWS.COM, Feb. 6,
2003,
http://www.news.com.com/Patent+scare+hits+streaming+industry/2100-1023_3983552.html.
8. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeabilityin Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1045, 1046 (2001).
9. Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (1785).
10. Alfonso G. Chan, A Proposed Defense to PatentInfringement, 1999 COMP. L. REV. &
TECH. J. 79, 79 (1999).
11. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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concerns regarding problematic patents in the current patent system. Part
III focuses attention on Acacia Media Technologies and the controversy
surrounding its current patent licensing strategy. Part IV discusses the
implications of enforcing Acacia's patents against universities and small
businesses-Acacia's primary targets. Part IV also suggests mandatory
mediation as a preferred alternative to litigation for resolving patent
disputes. Part V recommends three potential defenses against Acacia's
patents. Part VI concludes that Acacia's patent claims are fundamentally at
odds with the underlying principles of the Patent Clause and should not be
recognized or enforced.
II. BACKGROUND

A. What Is a Patentand Where Does It Come From?
The federal government issues patents to the inventors of certain new,
useful, and non-obvious inventions. 2 An issued patent confers unto a
patentee the right to exclude others from domestically making, using, or
selling the invention claimed
by the patent for twenty years from the patent
3
date.1
filing
application's
Few people realize that patent rights derive from the United States
Constitution, 4 which grants Congress the authority to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."' 15 This grant of authority should not be thought of as merely
a means to compensate the efforts of innovation, because the framers of the
Constitution thought it to be much more: the framers "thought it [was]
essential to the establishment of a democratic government that society be
16
provided with new ideas and knowledge."'
B. CurrentIssues and Problems with Internet Technology Patents
Despite the recognizably important and beneficial reasons for patents
in our society, "[a] feeding frenzy has taken its place-not just in the field

12. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).

13. Id. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.

15. Id.
16. Maureen Ryan, Cyberspaceas PublicSpace: A Public Trust Paradigmfor Copyright in
a Digital World, 79 OR. L. REV. 647, 650 (2000) (emphasis added).
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of patents, but in [intellectual property] generally ....
,7 As a result,
patent validity has recently come under major scrutiny.1 8 Many of the
current conflicts surrounding patents-primarily those concerning the
Internet and technology-appear to be byproducts of business-method
patents.' 9 Although there was no evidence that the Constitution's framers
intended for business methods to be patentable,20 in 1998 the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the right to patent a business method,
provided the business method produced a "useful, concrete and tangible
result.",2 1 Many business-method patents involve innovative or unique
ways of conducting business over the Internet, for example e-commerce or
Internet patents.22 An Internet patent is a general term for a "method[] of
transmitting information over the Internet; data compression techniques;
and encryption methods. 2 3 Unfortunately, Internet patents are often
controversial, and "the hardware and software elements are described and
claimed at such a high level of generality that they are for all practical
purposes nominal., 24 A glut of business-method patents relating to the
Internet has accumulated in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO), and the rampant filing of business-method patent applications
continues.2 5

17. Ben Depoorter, The Several Lives of Mickey Mouse: The Expanding Boundaries of
IntellectualProperty Law, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 14-15 (2004).
18. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The Problem With Patents, Apr. 23, 1999,
http://www.lessigorg/content/standardO,
1902,4296,00.html
("There '
is
growing
skepticism
among
academics
about
whether
such
state-imposed
monopolies help a rapidly evolving market such as the Internet. What is
"novel,"
"nonobvious"
or
"useful"
is
hard
enough
to
know
in
a
relatively
stable
field.
In
a
transforming
market,
it's
nearly
impossible
for
anyone
let
alone
an
underpaid
worker
in
the
U.S.
Department of Commerce who spends on average of eight hours evaluating
the prior art in a patent and gets paid based on how many he processes
- to identify what's 'novel."').
19. See Robert E. Lyon & Christopher A. Vanderlaan, Method Madness,23 L.A. LAW., Oct.
2000, at 28; Michael J. Meurer, Business Method Patents and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 309, 309 (2002).
20. Alan L. Durham, "Useful Arts" inthe Information Age, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1419, 1455
(1999).
21. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
22. See
Bradley
C.
Wright,
Internet
and
E-commerce
Patents,
http://www.bannerwitcoff.com/articles/ecommerce.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
23. Id.
24. Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579-80 n.5
(1999).
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Despite such problems, patents are necessary within the Internet
realm. However, with so many uncharted areas of the Internet and so many
people claiming rights to these patents, society should be concerned about
contemporary patent validity.
III. ACACIA TECHNOLOGY GROUP

Acacia describes itself as a company that "develops, acquires, and
licenses patented technologies. 2 6 It appears to be the first publicly traded
company to generate revenue solely by acquiring and licensing patents.2 7
In early 1992, H. Lee Browne and Paul Yurt developed five patents and
subsequently formed Greenwich Information Technologies LLC
("Greenwich").28 Acacia invested in and purchased Greenwich in 2001,
obtaining the rights to Greenwich's30 patents. 29 Acacia claims these patents

cover streaming media technology.
Streaming media is not the same as "downloading" and "the
difference between streaming and downloading is of critical importance. 31
A downloaded copy of a video file is the same as the original, but the
person who downloaded the file can change and redistribute the file.32
Alternatively, streaming media technology distributes digital content in a
manner that does not permit manipulation or redistribution of the streamed
file.33 For example, people can download movie files and permanently
have the files on their hard drives, whereas if the movie was streamed to
those same people, they could only view the movies.
Of the five patents Acacia obtained from Greenwich, the most

25. See Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or Business as
Usual?, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 347, 348 (2001); Peter Toren, An Idea Whose Time has
Come: Patenting Software and Business Methods: Culmination of a 25 Year Debate, BUS L.
TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 2001, 32, 38.
26. Acacia
Technologies
Group,
Company
Profile,
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/aboutus-main.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2004).
27. Teresa Riordan, Patents:A Patent Owner Claims to be Owed Royalties on Much of the
Internet's Media Content, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004, at C6.
28. Mark Hachman, Porn Kings Aflame Over Multimedia Patents: The Next Targets? Web
Radio, On-Demand Movies...
Then AOL?,
EXTREMETECH,
Dec.
16,
2002,
http://www.extremetech.com/article2/0,3973,1157409,000.asp.
29. See id.
30. See Geoffrey James, Patent Wars: Marketing Patent Rights Can Be a Real Headache,
BRANDWEEK,
June
1,
2003,
http://www.technologymarketing.com/bw/search/article -displayjsp?vnu content-id= 1899661.
31. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at

*4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
32. Id.
33. Id.
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controversial patents are 5,132,99234 and 6,144,702. 35 These provide,
respectively:
A system of distributing video and/or audio information [that]
employs digital signal processing to achieve high rates of data
compression. The compressed and encoded audio and/or video
information is sent over standard telephone, cable or satellite
broadcast channels to a receiver specified by a subscriber of the
service, preferably in less than real time, for later playback and
optional recording on standard audio and/or video tape.3 6
A system of distributing video and/or audio information [that]
employs digital signal processing to achieve high rates of data
compression. The compressed and encoded audio and/or video
information is sent over standard telephone, cable or satellite
broadcast channels to a receiver specified by a subscriber of the
service, preferably in less than real time, for later playback
and
37
optional recording on standard audio and/or video tape.
Interestingly, the patents do not mention the Internet as a medium of
transmission. 38 This fact immediately triggers speculation as to whether
the patents, even if valid, are applicable to the Internet.
Armed with the above-mentioned patents, Acacia began its aggressive
licensing strategy in 2002 with a wave of letters addressed to various
organizations in the adult entertainment industry. 39 The letters included a
notification that the companies' use of streaming media constituted patent
infringement, a informational letter about Acacia's patents, and a request
for licensing fees.4 0 The letters concluded with an ominous final statement:
"We hope that you will give our intellectual property the same respect as
you give to the intellectual property of the creators and publishers of the
music and video content that you promote and sell. '4 1 Said differently, do
not make us sue you.
42
Initially, Acacia only targeted "low-hanging fruit" or smaller firms.

34. U.S. Patent No. 5,132,992 (filed Jan. 7, 1991).
35. U.S. Patent No. 6,144,702 (filed July 23, 1998).
36. '992 Patent.
37. '702 Patent.
38. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
39. See e.g., Letter from Robert A. Berman, Senior V.P. Business Development and General
Counsel, Acacia Media Technologies Corp., to Michael Roe, ioMedia Partners (Jan. 28, 2003),
availableat http://www.radioio.com/acacia.pdf.

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Gyarfas, supra note 1.
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The "rollout plan ... involved convincing a host of smaller firms to sign
up, and the subsequent publicizing of those signings in order to create a
sense of momentum for Acacia's claims. 4 3 The terms of the licensing
agreement demanded royalties of about two percent of the infringing
company's estimated gross annual income. 44 Following Acacia's opening
move, the Electronic Frontier Foundation placed Acacia's patents on its
"Most Wanted" list; the "[laughably broad patent[s] would cover
everything from online distribution of home movies to scanned documents
and MP3s. '' 45 Although crafting a patent application to support a broad
interpretation is every good patent attorney's forte, there should always be
limits.
In August 2004, Acacia stepped up its aggressive licensing strategy
by targeting colleges and universities that use streaming media in areas that
include distance learning, video lectures, and "almost anything a college
46
does that involves moving audio and video files on computer networks.,,
Acacia sent letters to over 100 schools with the same ultimatum the adult
entertainment industry received-pay or get sued.47 If schools chose not to
comply with Acacia's initial demand, Acacia could increase the cost of
licensing and sue for past infringement.4 8
At last count, more than fifty colleges had coordinated an aggressive
legal response to Acacia's threats. 49 The National Association of College
and University Attorneys and EDUCAUSE, "a nonprofit association whose
mission is to advance higher education by promoting the intelligent use of
information technology," set up a response group to research the validity of
the DMT patents. 50 The sentiments of Sheldon E. Steinbach, vice president
and general counsel at the American Council on Education, sum up some
universities' opinions of Acacia's tactics: "[Acacia is] predatory
scum.., asserting a patent right of a dubious nature.",51 In response to
widespread concerns expressed by numerous universities, Acacia proposed

43. James, supra note 30.
44. Hachman, supra note 28.
45. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Patent Busting's Most Wanted: Acacia Technologies,
http://www.eff'org/patent/wanted/patent.php?p=acacia (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
46. Justin Pope, Streaming Company Takes Aim at Colleges: Acacia Media Technologies
Claims Violation of Company Patents,Aug. 9, 2004, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/564973 1.
47. Andrea L. Foster, Colleges Join Forces to Fight Company's Patent Claims to Certain
Online Audio and Video Technology, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 3, 2004, at A38.
48. See Pope, supra note 46.
49. See Foster, supra note 47.
Radar,
Update: Still Flying Underneath the
Daily, Acacia
50. Geoff
STREAMINGMEDIA.COM, Nov. 30, 2004, http://streamingmedia.com/article.asp?id=8971.

51. See Foster, supra note 47.
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a more lenient licensing agreement. 52 But even with licensing on very
generous terms, Acacia's broad patent claims raise serious policy concerns.
This is possibly why universities are still advised not to sign the
agreement. 3
Although Acacia is still negotiating with many universities, Acacia
has already started litigation against a number of online adult entertainment
companies. The validity of Acacia's patents was first put to the test when a
California district court conducted a four-day hearing in accordance with
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.54 At a Markman hearing, a court
interprets the disputed terms and phrases of the patents as a question of
law, rather than a question of fact for the jury to decide.55 The judge in the
Acacia case issued an order giving the court's construction of some of the
disputed patent terms and phrases and invited further briefings or motions
with respect to other terms.56 The terms "identification encoding means,"
"remote locations," and "sequence encoder" all came under heightened
scrutiny.5 7 This ruling suggests that the court is treating Acacia's claim
with some skepticism. 5 8 Although this ruling by no means invalidated the
patents, it certainly disinterred weak areas in Acacia's DMT patents.59
In response to the court order, defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment, contesting the disputed terms and seeking invalidation of the
patents. 60 No decision has been made by the court. A favorable ruling will
considerably lower the cost of litigation and allow these companies to focus
on the remaining patents.6 ' Meanwhile, despite possible flaws in its
patents, Acacia is persuading some big name companies to jump on board
63
62
its licensing program, including Playboy, The Walt Disney Company,

52. Id.

53. See Pope, supra note 46.
54. Acacia Media Techs. Corp. v. New Destiny Internet Group, No. SA CV 02-1040JW(MLGx), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13415, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 12, 2004) (citing Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)).
55. Marbnan, 517 U.S. at 372.
56. See Geoff Daily, DistrictCourt Delivers Blow to Acacia, STREAMINGMEDIA.COM, July
14, 2004, http://www.streamingmedia.com/article.asp?id=8724&page=l.
57. See New Destiny Internet Group, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13415, at *7, *23, *58.
58. See Daily, supra note 56.
59. Id.
60. Charles Farrar, Acacia Challengers Filefor InvalidationJudgment, AVN ONLINE.COM,
Sept.
22,
2004,
http://www.avnonline.com/index.php?Primary-Navigation=WebExclusiveNews&Action=Vie
wArticle&Content_ID=192917.
61. See Daily, supra note 56.
62. Press Release, Acacia Technologies, Acacia Technologies Licenses Digital Media
Transmission
Technology
to
Playboy
(Mar.
15,
2004),
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and World Wrestling Entertainment.64 The fact that companies of this
stature have conceded to Acacia's licensing demands may indicate that the
patents are valid.65 Whether Acacia's patents are valid or not, they raise
important questions concerning Acacia's licensing strategy and the
influence the patents have on the academic community.
IV. ANALYSIS
Acacia contends it has expended tremendous time and effort to ensure
its patents are enforceable and claims that its licensing agreements are fair,
legitimate, and modest. 66 However, even if the patents are technically
valid, there are arguments against enforcing them. Acacia's patents impede
the dissemination of knowledge by requiring licensing fees for a
technology used to promote knowledge. Standing alone, this argument
may very well be unpersuasive as it can be applied to almost all patented
educational material. However, Acacia's patents, in conjunction with the
company's business practices, violate the underlying principles of the
Patent Clause. Consequently, the patents should not be enforced even if
they are technically valid. Additionally, there are few adequate alternatives
for smaller companies to challenge Acacia's patents other than engaging in
costly litigation.67 For this reason, there should be mandatory mediation
between the patent owner and alleged infringer prior to litigation.
A. Acacia's Patents Contradictthe OriginatingConstitutionalObjective of
Patentsby ObstructingKnowledge
Exclusivity is an important and necessary goal of patents. It is also
important, however, for the court to consider the public's interests before
granting exclusivity to a patent holder.68 The public's interests are
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/pr/031504Playboy.pdf.
63. Press Release, Acacia Technologies, Acacia Technologies Licenses Digital Media
Transmission Technology to the Walt Disney Company (Feb. 26, 2004),
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/pr/022604Disney.pdf.
64. Press Release, Acacia Technologies, Acacia Technologies Licenses Digital Media
Transmission Technology to World Wrestling Entertainment (Sept. 21, 2004),
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/pr/092104WWE.pdf.
65. See Charles Farrar, Acacia Signs Playboy to DMT Deal, AVN ONLiNE.COM, Mar. 15,
2004,
http://www.avn.com/index.phpPrimary-Navigation=Articles&Action=View_Article&Content-I
D=77111.
66. See generally Borland, supra note 7 (quoting Robert Berman, Acacia's general counsel,
as saying: "We did a tremendous amount of research on these patents' enforceability.").
67. Id.
68. See Lyon & Vanderlaan, supra note 19 ("[A] court must take the public interest into
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especially important when patent enforcement affects society in a manner
that goes beyond the original motive for including the Patent Clause in the
United States Constitution: a means to provide incentives for innovation.69
The central ideas of the Patent Clause were promulgated by the
"progress mandate of the Enlightenment" and the Age's participants.7 v
Margaret Chon noted that "[i]n light of the Enlightenment emphasis on the
capacity of the intellect in general, and the utility of facts and scientific
observation in particular, both Madison's and Jefferson's ideas on property
indicate that access to knowledge might be a fundamental civil right."'"
Put differently, access to knowledge, like access to public resources, is an
essential element of socialization-and possibly a fundamental right.72 As
Joseph Sax noted, "Recognition that our accumulated knowledge and
insight should be viewed as elements of a common heritage undergirds the
basic premise of intellectual-property rules that govern patents and
copyrights. 73 In short, knowledge plays a critical role in our society as an
element of our common heritage and as the underlying force or "basic
premise" for establishing the appropriate applications of intellectual
property laws in America. Thus, when a patent interferes with an
American's access to knowledge, it interferes with his or her common
heritage and the basic building block of a successful patent system.
Following this reasoning, Acacia's patents are flawed in ways far beyond a
court's determination of their literal or technical validity. Acacia's patents,
in their application to scholastic institutions, ironically "infringe" upon an
American's "intellectual property": the spread of knowledge itself.
Nevertheless, "[i]n some cases.., intellectual property law will
protect the moral rights of authors even when doing so imposes a cost on
society. 74 Such cases suggest that a court may protect the inventor of a
patent even if doing so might contradict public policy. Despite this
possibility, "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose
effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to
restrict free access to materials already available. 75 A decision in favor of
account before allowing a patentee to exercise the most basic right of a patent grantexclusivity.").
69. See Mark A. Lenrley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 889 (1997) (book review) [hereinafter M. Lemley].
70. Margaret Chon, Postmodern "Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power,43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 121 (1993).
71. Id. at 135.
72. See id.; Ryan, supra note 16, at 712.
73. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 3 (1999).

74. M. Lemley, supra note 69, at 890.
75. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (emphasis added).
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Acacia will effectively remove knowledge from the public domain by
restricting access to lectures and other educational information supported
by streaming media. This argument is further buttressed by the Supreme
of the Patent Clause is to
Court's suggestion that the overall purpose
"advance[] the progress of science and art."'7 6
Do Acacia's patents "advance the progress of science and art" more
than the institutions that write and define the terms "science" and "art"
themselves? Clearly, Acacia's patents per se obstruct "the progress of
science and art," as is evidenced by the fact that Acacia identifies "elearning" as one of its targets. 77 Acacia's patents appear to "violate[] the
purpose of advancing the progress of arts and sciences because the
protection of producers far outweighs what is necessary to achieve the
protection of incentives of authors. 78 In other words, a court will actually
be enforcing Acacia's patents simply because Acacia owns them, not
because the patents "advance[] the progress of science and art," the true
rationale behind patents. Courts should not condone the validation of
patents that contradict the very principles which led to the inclusion of the
Patent Clause in the Constitution.
However, this argument could easily be applied to all forms of
educational materials, including copyrighted textbooks, patented computer
hardware, and software used in college classrooms. These materials might
remove knowledge from the public domain if the inventor or author refuses
to license the work. In this case, Acacia is simply enforcing what it thinks
it is entitled to. 79 Thus, it is not the effect of its patent alone that should
subject Acacia to scrutiny, but the effect of its patent in conjunction with its
method of enforcing compliance with its licensing strategy.
Another concern arises because universities are forced to expend
academic funds to protect themselves from Acacia's all-encompassing
patents. Although the patents may not even be enforceable, a practical
response is to pay the licensing fee because litigation is generally a far
more expensive alternative. 81 Either way, litigation or licensing, colleges
are expending money. The situation is a catch twenty-two. These troubles
arise merely from harnessing the power of the Internet to facilitate learning.

76. Feist Publ'ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
Group,
DMT
Technology,
77. Acacia
Technologies
http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/technologydint.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2005).
78. Depoorter, supra note 17, at 15.
79. See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and PropertyRules for CommercializingInventions,
85 MINN. L. REv. 697, 728 (2000).

80. See Foster, supra note 47, at A38.
81. See id.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

52

[Vol. 26:41

Acacia's scheme is all the more frustrating when the money inevitably lost
by universities from the Acacia saga could have been used for innovation
and knowledge; thus, the direct objective of the Patent Clause is frustrated.
Moreover, some propose that the impact of Acacia's patents will lower the
quality of education.82 Schools that might have considered the academic
use of streaming media may be less likely to harness its advantages.8 3 The
result is confusion in the academic world. 4 Amidst this confusion, schools
are invited by the National Association of College and Universities and the
American Counsel on Education to watch an informational webcast
detailing information about Acacia and options for colleges and
universities.8 5 This informational webcast is only provided after payment
of a $149 fee.8 6 Acacia's licensing strategy, it seems, will likely force
academia to expend money both directly and indirectly. Ironically, the
format of the informational session, "on-demand webcast," is another one
of Acacia's technological targets.8 7 Apparently, universities and colleges
cannot escape spending money as a result of Acacia's far-reaching
licensing strategy.
B. Downfalls of Upholding Acacia's PatentAgainst the Online Industry
From the online industry's standpoint, it is difficult to accept Acacia's
patents as valid.88 The online business community was shocked given that
Acacia does not mention the Internet as a medium of transmission in its
82. See generally Corey Murray, Schools' Streaming Video Use at Risk, ESCHOOL NEWS
ONLINE.COM, Apr. 1, 2004, http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/showstory.cfmn?ArticlelD-4958
("Legal experts from these and other schools say the royalty demands could spell trouble for
revenue-generating distance-education programs, which are relied upon to connect students
across great distances while appealing to pupils with vastly different learning styles. If the royalty
demands exceed the profits generated by such courses, they say, the practice could become costprohibitive, adding a debilitating expense to schools' already waning technology budgets.").
83. See generally Pope, supra note 46 (noting Acacia is boosting efforts to collect money
from colleges and universities for using streaming media technology that it claims is covered by

its patents).
84. See id.
85. NACUBO, Acacia Media Technologies Patent Infilngement Notices: Options for
Colleges and Universities, http://www.nacubo.org/x4447.xml (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).

86. Id.
87. See

Acacia

Technologies

http://www.acaciatechnologies.com/technology-dmt.htm

Group,

DMT

Technology,

(last visited Oct. 3, 2005) (stating

"Acacia's Digital Media Transmission or 'DMT' technology involves the transmission and
receipt of digital audio and/or audio video content via a variety of means including the internet,
cable, satellite, and local area networks.").
88. See Lawrence G. Walters, The Acacia Issue, ADULT NETSURPRISE,
http://www.adultnetsurprise.com/businesszone/tutorial-acaicaissue.phtml (last visited Sept. 20,
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patents. 89 The lack of Internet references alone, though, does not invalidate
Acacia's patents. Inventors who were granted patents prior to the creation
of the Internet can still apply "extensions of their [patented] ideas to the
Internet.' 90 Streaming media has long been commonplace on the Internet
and is characterized as "one of the most basic multimedia technologies on
the Net. ' 9 1 Yet by March 2004, Acacia had licensed its patents to over a
hundred companies who use some form of streaming media. 92 However,
the companies targeted by Acacia are not Microsoft, Apple, and Real, the
true heavyweights in streaming media, but smaller companies with smaller
budgets.9 3 It is true Acacia has committed some larger companies to its
licensing agreement. Acacia claims this is an indication of the validity of
its patents.94 However, company names like "Playboy" and "The Walt
Disney Company" should indicate the size of these company's budgets. In
contrast, of the approximately
500 demand letters sent out, most were sent
95
to smaller companies.
Acacia's tactics exemplify a "new kind of company that sees patent
96
confusion surrounding the Internet as a chance to make a quick buck.,
Herein lies the problem with Acacia's licensing strategy. Jason Schultz, an
Electronic Frontier Foundation Staff Attoney, articulated the bottom line:
"faced with million-dollar legal demands [smaller companies] have no
choice but to capitulate and pay license fees." 97 In the end, smaller
companies such as RadiolO.com, would be severely impacted by either
royalty demands or litigation.98 This type of patent practice is brutal, and
unfortunately, collecting royalties from small companies on potentially
bogus patents is not an exclusive practice of Acacia. 99 Targeting smaller

89. Id.
90. See Bob Sullivan, Patent Piracy or Goliath's Comeuppance?: Small Firms Often
Targeted
in
Obscure
Infringement
Cases,
MSNBC,
Apr.
30,
2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4837371.
91. Borland, supra note 7.
92. See Farrar,supra note 65.

93. See Schumacher-Rasmussen, supra note 4.
94. See Farrar,supra note 65.
95. See Hachman, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
96. Sullivan, supra note 90.
97. Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Asks Public to Identify Bad Patents in Patent
Busting Contest, June 10, 2004, http://www.eff.org/news/archives/2004 06.php.
98. See Borland, supra note 7 ("[Acacia's] letter to RadiolO is just a small part of an
expanding licensing campaign by Acacia.").

99. See Edward Hsieh, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving Patent
Quality, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 685-86 (2004) (detailing the practice of Pangea Intellectual
Properties, a company that routinely sues small businesses located far from the venue of lawsuit
to increase the likelihood of settlement).
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companies who cannot afford to retain lawyers is becoming
commonplace. 100 This concern becomes more pronounced considering
Greenwich, the firm that Acacia acquired the patents from, "never
developed its patented ideas into products."' 10 1 Acacia owns merely an
abstract, and it appears Acacia is being rewarded not for innovation or
development but for mere proprietary ownership. Unfortunately, "the rules
regarding the ownership of intellectual property rights are heavily skewed
to protect the interests of corporations, not individual authors and
inventors."'10 2 It seems Acacia spends its money not on innovation or
development, but on buying patents only enforced by the threat of
litigation. This practice is not a genuine goal to compensate the inventor.
Another troubling aspect of Acacia's patents is, despite the speculative
Markman ruling, its continuing pursuit of royalties.10 3 As a result, smaller
companies suffer even if a court subsequently finds Acacia's patents
unenforceable.
In response to allegations of targeting smaller businesses, Robert
Berman, a member of Acacia's general counsel, contends that Acacia's socalled modest royalties will not put anybody out of business. 10 4 Mr.
Berman's contention is wrong. Acacia, through its tactics, is a perfect
example of a company that "may succeed even if the patent is likely invalid
or the defendant is unlikely to be an infringer... [because] ...[t]he high
cost of defending a patent suit can strain the financial resources of a small
company.' 1 5 Mr. Berman also contends that the larger media companies
do not utilize all of the components of Acacia's patents, and Acacia has

100. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Patent Busting's Most Wanted: Acacia
Technologies, http://www.eff.org/patent/wanted/patent.php?p=acacia (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
101. See Jon Healey, New Foe for Webcasters in Royalty Fight: Acacia Research Says
Many Online Sites Infringe Its Patents in DigitalTransmission, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at C11.
102. M. Lemley, supra note 69, at 882.
103. See generally Geoff Daily, Acacia Makes Its Case, STREAM1NGMEDIA.COM,
Mar.
9,
2005,
http://www.streanngmedia.com/article.asp?id=9041 &page=I
("By the end of 2004, the total number of companies that had purchased

a

license

from

Acacia

Technologies

Group

for

their

Digital

Media

Transmission (DMT) patents had reached 277."); Pope, supra note 46 ("In
a
preliminary
ruling
in
Acacia's
dispute
with
adult
entertainment
sites
last
month,
a
federal
judge
ruled
that
several
terms
in
Acacia's
patents
were
indefinite,
a
verdict
that
could
weaken
potential
Acacia
cases against
other streaming
video users.
Now, critics
of the company
are
saying
that
it's trying
to
make
a fast
buck
off schools
nervous
about
litigation
before
a
federal
judge
makes
a
final,
potentially
crippling ruling in that case.").
104. Schumacher-Rasmussen, supra note 4.
105. Meurer, supra note 19, at 323.
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16
therefore yet to challenge Microsoft, Apple, and RealNetworks. 1
However, each of these big name companies "not only create codecs,
server software, and players, but also stream content on their own Web
sites." 10 7 Astoundingly, in a different lawsuit, a federal court previously
came to a judicialfinding offact that "RealNetworks offers products that
enable consumers to access audio and video content over the Internet
through a process known as 'streaming '' 108 This fact proffers compelling
evidence that Acacia is avoiding challenging larger companies that utilize
streaming media.
In sum, the Acacia saga bares little resemblance to concepts like
"knowledge" or "innovation," the building blocks of the U.S. Patent
Clause. It is hard to imagine that the framers of the Patent Clause intended
persons or companies to benefit from patent protection when they: (1)
neither create nor attempt to develop patentable subject matter; (2) use
questionable business practices to enforce a potentially bogus patent; (3)
utilize the patent solely for financial gain; and (4) target small businesses
even before the patent is judicially verified. None of these outcomes even
remotely promotes the "useful arts" the Patent Clause demands. Therefore,
because Congress may not create patent laws contrary to the purpose of the
Patent Clause, 10 9 Congress must re-examine how Acacia and Acacia-esque
patents are being developed, enforced, and even exploited.

C. Suggestion: PatentMediation
Inventors often commit extensive time and money to develop a
patent. 1° Without some form of legal protection, "infringers have the
power to free ride the intellectual property... [while] the owner alone
incurs the substantial fixed costs.""' While this consideration is a critical
factor in balancing intellectual property policy, 112 the "pendulum may have
swung too far" in favor of the patent holder." 3 Gaining recognition in the

106. Schumacher-Rasmussen, supra note 4.
107. Id. (emphasis added).
108. RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889,

at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
109. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
110. See Kevin M. Lemley, I'll Make Him an Offer He Can'tRefuse: A Proposed Model for
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REv. 287, 290

(2004) [hereinafter K. Lemley].
111. Id.
112. See Conigliario, supra note 8, at 1046 n.2.
113. See generally Sullivan, supra note 90 (citing examples of alleged patent extortion
against small companies "by a patent holder who seemingly emerges from nowhere").
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early 1990's, this problem is ever present in our patent system. 114 Also,
litigation is one protection often favoring the patent holder.
Litigation is the typical alternative to paying licensing fees in a patent
dispute. 1 5
Unfortunately, "U.S. patent validity litigation [is a]
problem... because of the unique high-cost litigation system required in
America."'1 16 As in the Acacia saga, universities and online businesses
seem to have no recourse other than to acquiesce to Acacia's demands or
face litigation. Alternatives to patent litigation have been proposed in the
past. 17 However, Acacia's tactics are a prototypical example that
problems still persist.
Lawmakers should create an alternative to litigation to protect small
companies from an aggressive licensing strategy like Acacia's.
A
mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) procedure should be in
place to initially evaluate patents before companies implement a costly and
detrimental licensing strategy.' 1 8 As an alternative to litigation, mediation
"is designed to alleviate the massive risks associated with litigation,"
"offers substantial cost savings over litigation," and "often saves about
eighty percent of the total costs of litigation."" 9
Mediation in the patent dispute setting is not a new proposal. One
author, Steven J. Elleman, explains some of the considerations of mediation
in a patent setting:
Although there will be some additional problems and costs
associated with mandatory mediation, the overall benefits due to
increased settlements should pay large dividends. Utilizing a
professional mediator and forcing the parties to seriously
consider settlement should increase settlement levels. This will
lead to quicker resolutions and lower costs, both of which are
particular problems in the area of patent disputes. The costs to
114. Id.
115. See generally Steven J. Elleman, Problems in Patent Litigation: MandatoryMediation
May Provide Settlements and Solutions, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 759, 760 (1996) ("Patent
law is quite a fertile field for litigation. The most common form of patent litigation is an action in
patent infringement, wherein the patent holder alleges that a second party has infringed upon one
or more of the claims of the patent. Other common inter partes patent issues include disputes as
to licensing agreements, challenges to the validity of the patent and interference proceedings.").
116. Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to Change the Patent Reexamination Statute to
Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 887, 888 (1994).
117. See id. at 887-88.
118. See generally Michael H. King & Peter N. Witty, Know Thyself as You Know Thy
Enemy: Setting Goals and Keeping Focus When Mediating IP Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 329,
330 (2004) (advocating mediation due to its lower cost and ability to finely tailor creative
business solutions).
119. K. Lemley, supra note 110, at 312.
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society that arise from courtroom delays of new technology will
also be reduced. Mediation may also cause better perceptions of
the court system by parties who participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, aside from the time and relatively modest costs
associated with patent mediation, "[t]here seems to be little
downside risk for participation in a non-binding procedure...."
Unfortunately, mediation "may also be the least understood
[form of ADR] by intellectual property attorneys." Thus, a
program of mandatory mediation can bring the advantages of a
beneficial, under-utilized process to the parties in a patent
dispute. This can benefit our court system and society as a
whole. 2 0
Unfortunately, mediation is not mandatory today. As a result,
litigation remains the standard method for determining the validity of
Acacia-like patents that skirt the edge of enforceability. Acacia's strategy
underscores the vulnerability of smaller companies to these high litigation
mediation can be
costs, and as the above discussion indicates, mandatory
2'
disputes.'
patent
in
litigation
to
an effective alternative
V. POSSIBLE DEFENSES AGAINST AcACIA'S PATENTS

Unfortunately, the above suggestion is not mandatory and when
patents, like Acacia's, rest on the fine line between enforceable and not, the
only method of determining the validity of the patents is through litigation.
When companies use patents in an Acacia-like manner, implicating the
above enumerated concerns, schools and online businesses need a legal
defense. Some existing exceptions to the exclusivity of broad patents like
Acacia's include the experimental use exception, the patent misuse
doctrine, and laches.122 Unfortunately, many of the elements these
exceptions require are not present in the Acacia saga. However, the
underlying principles leading to the establishment of these exceptions can
be applied to Acacia's patents. Courts already consider the public interest
when ruling on patent issues, 123 so with some judicial activism, a court may
allow the technology claimed by Acacia's patents to fit within these
exceptions.
120. Elleman, supra note 115, at 777-78 (footnotes omitted).
121. See id. at 777 (stating that non-binding mandatory mediation preserves parties' rights
to a jury trial and due process, at minimal cost while allowing flexibility and preserved relations
in settlement).
122. See discussion infra Parts V.A-C.
123. See Elleman, supra note 115 at 767 n.46.
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A. The Experimental Use Exception
The experimental use exception is a doctrine in patent law which
provides that the right to exclude use of the patented subject matter is not
absolute. 124 The exception was judicially established when Justice Story
held that actions "merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose
of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described
effects" are not infringement. 125 The doctrine has grown. In 1963, Ruth v.
Stearns-RogerManufacturing Co. 126 suggested that using patented subject
matter for non-pecuniary and experimental reasons does not constitute
infringement. 27 The doctrine seems to have room for -including a
university's use of streaming media for strictly educational purposes.
Although "the Federal Circuit has shown a marked tendency to take a very
narrow view of the experimental use exception,"'' 2 8 it has only taken this
29
view in cases involving commercial activity.
While universities do not strictly use streaming media for the specific
purpose of experimentation, the exception seems to concern the
preservation of intellectual exploration-a university's modus operandi.
"[It] is now well settled, that an experiment with a patented article for the
sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere
amusement, is not an infringement of the rights of the patentee.""' The
parallel between experimentation and a university's use of streaming media
for scholastic purposes is evident. The key is intellectual thirst. For
example, through lectures, on-campus speakers, e-learning, live surgeries,
and review sessions, universities gratify the philosophical tastes,
intellectual curiosities, and amusements of their student body. In most
circumstances, students should be entitled to explore educational
opportunities provided through streaming media without interference.
124. See, e.g., Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679, 680 (2d Cir. 1963)
(noting that "not every unauthorized construction of a patented article constitutes an
infringement"); Andrew J. Caruso, The Experimental Use Exception: An Experimentalist's
View,14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 215, 216 (2003).

125. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); see
Caruso, supra note 124, at 216.
126. Ruth v. Steams-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697, 713 (D. Colo. 1935), rev'd on other
grounds by 87 F.2d 35, 42 (10th Cir. 1936) ("The making or using of a patented invention merely
for experimental purposes, without any intent to deprive profits or practical advantage therefrom,

is not infringement.").
127. See id.; see also Byan v. Bullard, 4 F. Cas. 934, 935 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 2,262)
("[T]he [infringing] act must be with intent to deprive the patentees of some lawful profit.").
128. Caruso, supra note 124, at 224.
129. See id.
130. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279).
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Therefore, the nexus between experimentation and streaming media in
academia seems to exist. With enough judicial consideration of the
theoretical underpinnings of the experimental use exception, a court may
apply the exception to streaming media for academic purposes.
B. The PatentMisuse Doctrine
The patent misuse doctrine holds that if "a patent owner improperly
exploits his patent by violating the antitrust laws or extending the patent
beyond its lawful scope, the courts will withhold any remedy for
infringement, even against an infringer who is not harmed by the abusive
practice."' 13 1 This defense "prevents the patent owner from using his patent
in a manner 'contrary to public policy.""' 132 Courts most frequently apply
the doctrine to protect against patent "tying. ' 133 However, it certainly has
other applications. Certain patents are per se patent misuse; for example,
"[riequiring a licensee to pay royalties after the patent has expired ....
Essentially, the patent misuse doctrine is a manifestation of the unclean
hands doctrine. 35 It seems the defense would punish a company, like
Acacia, that requires and obtains licensing fees while its patent's validity is
still under judicial consideration, singles out companies that must pay the
licensing agreement due to the expense of litigation, or demands royalties
from scholastic institutions. Acacia's hands appear to be sullied, and the
principles inherent in the patent misuse doctrine seem to apply.
However, the defense "is not an open-ended defense that arises from
any wrongful conduct.' ' 136 There is a two-step test for establishing patent
misuse:
First, the court must determine if the act is reasonably within the
patent grant. If so, then the act cannot be a misuse because it
has not expanded the scope of the patent right. Second, if the
act is not reasonably within the patent grant, then the court must
131. 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY,
VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 19.01 (1996).

132. Peter David G. Sabido, Defending Against Patent Infringement Suits in StandardSetting Organizations:Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Technologies AG, 13 FED. CIR. B.J. 635, 650
(2004) (quoting Robert P. Taylor, Standard Setting: A Growing Morass, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTITRUST 545 (2002)).
133. Kelly Hershey, Note, Scheiber v. Dolby Laboratories, Inc., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir.
2002), 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 159, 163 (2003) ("[T]ying occurs when a patentee licenses one
product (the 'tying product') contingent upon the licensing of another product (the 'tied
product').").
134. HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 183 (4th ed. 2003).

135. Id. at 182.
136. Id.
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effect that is
determine whether the act has an anticompetitive
37
not justifiable under the rule of reason.
Generally, patent owners are within their patent-granted rights to demand
licensing fees. Thus, despite the fact that Acacia's conduct may be
wrongful, it probably does not satisfy the first element of the patent misuse
test. Moreover, "when the alleged misuse is a licensing arrangement, the
evidence must reveal that the overall effect of the license tends to restrain
38
competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined relevant market."'
Here, Acacia's licensing strategy is common practice, and hence there are
likely no anticompetitive effects to satisfy the second element of the patent
misuse test. In sum, a patent misuse defense will not defeat a claim by
Acacia for collection of licensing fees.
C. Laches
"The elements underlying the usual Laches defense are: (1) the patent
owner unreasonably and inexcusably delayed filing suit for infringement,
and (2) the alleged infringer has been materially prejudiced by the
delay."' 139 The court maintains the discretion to deny the defense even
when all the elements have been satisfied.' 40 In the first element, the delay
period for filing an infringement claim begins if, within "the exercise of
reasonable diligence[, the patent owner] should have known[] of the
alleged infringement ....[because] it was pervasive, open, and
notorious.' 14 1 As previously mentioned, Acacia obtained the rights to its
patents in 1992, approximately twelve years prior to its offensive licensing
strategy. Yet, Acacia only recently filed suit for infringement, despite the
fact that streaming media has been "pervasive, open, and notorious." Case
in point, streaming media has existed since the early 1990s, 142 and in June
2002 streaming media was used in 400,000 Web pages, representing a 412
percent increase in the twelve preceding months. 43 Organizations like the
Internet Streaming Media Alliance, Streaming Media World, and
Streaming Media, Inc. are all indications of the "pervasive" nature of

137. Id. at 183 (footnotes omitted).
138. Id. at 184.
139. Id. at 184-85; see Sabido, supra note 132, at 647.
140. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 134, at 185-86; Sabido, supra note 132, at 647.
141. SCHWARTZ, supra note 134, at 185-86.
142. Dr. Jian Lu, Media Streaming and Broadcasting on the Internet, ENJOY WEB,
http://www.enjoyweb.com/company/pdf/StreamingOverview.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2005).
143. NUA Internet Surveys, Streaming Media Saps Business Bandwidth, June 14, 2002,
http://www.nua.com/surveys/index.cgi?f-VS&artid=905358061 &rel=true.
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streaming media in the last decade. 44 It is clear that streaming media has
been used conspicuously for more than a decade. 45 Acacia's failure to file
an infringement suit before now is an unreasonable delay, and therefore,
the first element of laches is satisfied.
The second element requires that the "alleged infringer has been
materially prejudiced by the delay."'' 46 A recent Google search located
over eight million results for "streaming media," 147 indicating the large
number of online companies that depend on streaming media and are
potentially prejudiced by Acacia's failure to immediately claim rights to
Streaming media is an important technology for
streaming media.
companies because it "guard[s] against the unauthorized copying and
redistribution of their content.' ' 148 Otherwise, companies would be forced
to use downloading, a technology that permits copies of the digital content
to "be created at the touch of a button."' 149 Had Acacia brought suit within
a reasonable time, companies might not have spent the last decade devoting
time and resources to incorporate streaming media technology into their
business practices.
Each element of the defense appears to be satisfied. However, as
mentioned, the judge may use his or her discretion to deny this defense.
But in consideration of the aforementioned questionable business practices,
the judge's discretion should favor small businesses and universities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The objectives of our patent system are underscored in the following
quote: "Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system... ,,5o Each of
these factors have an important significance in our society. Unless a court
keeps these objectives in mind when enforcing patents, the component
parts of a successful and productive patent system deteriorate, and the
incentives that originally motivated the framers to include the Patent
Clause in the United States Constitution become clouded. With this in
mind, granting exclusivity to Acacia seems to be against the public's
Media,"
Term
"Streaming
Google.com,
Search
144. See
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=%22streaming+media%22 (last visited Sep. 23, 2005).
145. See Lu supranote 142.
146. SCHWARTZ, supra note 134, at 185.

147. See Google.com, supra note 144.
148. RealNetworks, Inc., v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889,
at *4 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000).
149. Id.
150. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
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interest. And it is the public's interest a court should consider before
granting exclusivity to a patent holder.' 5' In the past, the Supreme Court
has limited intellectual property rights when confronted by a significant
public interest,152 and Acacia's patents should meet the same demise.
Acacia's patents and licensing strategy fundamentally undermine the goals
and objectives of the Constitution's Patent Clause and, therefore, violate
public policy. 53 Acacia's offensive licensing strategy aimed at colleges
and universities disrupts154 and distorts the schools' most critical aim: to
disseminate knowledge.
Additionally, "Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or
to restrict free access to materials already available."' 5 5 When any
company restricts access to materials in such a way, enforcement rights
should not be granted because the real "infringement" is not the school's
use of streaming media, but rather the prevention of students' access to
educational materials. It is the opinion of this author that if a court deems
Acacia's patents valid and enforceable, thus preventing schools from
streaming intellectual media, the patents would be "remov[ing] existent
knowledge from the public domain" by preventing academia from utilizing
56
the benefits of disseminating knowledge via streaming media.
Moreover, by restricting the use of streaming media in an educational
setting, Acacia's patents restrict free access to scholastic material available
through this medium. Even if Acacia does suspend its pursuit to obtain
licensing agreements from universities, the issue persists because schools
have already been forced to expend money in response to Acacia's
demands. For this reason, patents having any detrimental effect on
knowledge or innovation should rarely, if ever, be enforceable as they are
entirely inconsistent with the Patent Clause.
Furthermore, companies should not be forced to buckle to the
demands of a licensing strategy just because doing so is more economical

151. Lyon & Vanderlaan, supra note 19, at 50 ("[A] court must take the public interest into
account before allowing a patentee to exercise the most basic right of a patent grantexclusivity.").
152. See e.g., Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also M.
Lemley, supra note 69, at 889 ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly invoked the instrumental
nature of intellectual property rights, not hesitating to limit those rights when the public interest
has so required.").
153. See generally Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
156. See id.
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than disputing a patent. 57 By allowing this type of licensing strategy,
patent law is effectively issuing a "letter of marque and reprisal" for larger
firms to exploit smaller firms despite possible flaws in the asserted patents.
Under these circumstances, no useful arts are being promoted and no
innovation is encouraged.
Just one of the above effects of Acacia's patents and licensing
strategy might not be enough to single out the company's actions; however,
when considered as a whole, the Acacia saga is completely unacceptable.
A new practical solution, such as mandatory mediation, might provide an
alternative to litigation that allows patents to be more appropriately
disputed. However, until a mandatory alternative to litigation exists, large
companies and their patent arsenal will forever be pointing their weapons
in the direction of smaller companies.
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